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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: The             
Role of Climate Tipping 
Xin Liu, Lei Zhu, Xiao-Bing Zhang, and Magnus Hennlock 
Abstract 
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are considered an important way to increase the 
efficiency of emission abatement and climate change mitigation. This paper uses a game-theoretic 
model to investigate the effect of possible tipping events, which would bring catastrophic and 
irreversible damage to ecological systems and human societies, on individual countries’ emission 
decisions and on the scale of participation in IEAs that would maintain stability of the IEA. The results 
show that if the threshold of total emissions for triggering the tipping events is high, the possibility of 
climate tipping would have no effect on the stable number of participants in IEAs. However, if the 
threshold for tipping is low, whether the climate system would cross the tipping point depends on the 
magnitude of damage due to climate tipping. Moreover, the effect of possible tipping events would 
increase the size of a stable coalition if the signatories’ coalition is the first mover. Otherwise, in a Nash 
equilibrium, the possibility of tipping would decrease the scope of participation in IEAs if the tipping 
damage is high, while it would induce more countries to sign IEAs if the tipping damage is moderate. 
 
 Key Words: international environmental agreements, climate change, catastrophic damage, 
tipping events 
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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: The 
Role of Climate Tipping 
Xin Liu, Lei Zhu, Xiao-Bing Zhang, and Magnus Hennlock∗ 
1. Introduction 
When the rise in global temperature reaches a certain threshold, it is likely that 
there will be abrupt and irreversible events that can cause catastrophic damage to 
ecological systems and human societies, which are called tipping events. The fifth 
assessment report by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) predicts 
catastrophes such as melting glaciers, sea level rise, loss of biodiversity, and so on, once 
the increase in temperature compared to the pre-industrial period exceeds 2℃ (IPCC 
2014a). The threshold for triggering these events is known as the ‘tipping point’, which 
has drawn the attention of political circles and the academic community in recent years 
(Russill and Nyssa 2009). Whether and when the tipping point will occur depends on 
how we regulate emissions. Therefore, climate policy could be reshaped as a response to 
the threat of climate tipping events. 
It is clear that one country’s actions will influence other countries, because 
climate change is essentially a ‘public bad.’ The international community has agreed on 
the need for joint action to limit GHG emissions (IPCC 2014b). Cooperation among 
countries in reducing GHG emissions could generally improve efficiency in emission 
reductions, due to a shared decision-making objective and concerted action among 
players (Barrett 1994; McGinty 2006; Rubio and Ulph 2007). In order to promote such 
cooperation, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
has conducted several rounds of discussions, leading to the signing of several remarkable 
agreements, e.g., the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.  
The threat of climate tipping events could have an influence on international 
cooperation, in that the possibility of these abrupt and irreversible events could affect 
each country’s decision on its emission strategies. Therefore, it is of great significance to 
investigate how the emission strategies of individual countries might change under the 
threat of climate tipping events and how this would affect their interest in participating in 
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international environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate change. In this paper, the 
possible tipping of climate is incorporated into a standard model of IEAs to investigate its 
effect on GHG emissions and international cooperation. Specifically, we build a game-
theoretical model, which integrates the standard IEA framework with the possibility of 
climate tipping, to illustrate how the threat of climate tipping would affect individual 
countries’ optimal emissions, their decisions about signing IEAs, and whether the climate 
system will cross the tipping point in equilibrium. We also investigate the effect of the 
tipping threat on the size of stable IEAs in a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the 
signatories’ coalition is the first mover.  
Our analysis reveals some interesting findings regarding the linkage between 
climate tipping and participation in IEAs. 1) If the threshold of total emissions for 
triggering the tipping events is high, the possibility of climate tipping would have no 
effect on the size of IEAs. 2) If the threshold for tipping is low, whether the climate 
system will cross the tipping point depends on the magnitude of damage due to climate 
tipping. 3) In the Nash equilibrium, the threat of climate tipping would decrease the size 
of IEAs if the tipping damage is high, while it would induce countries to sign IEAs if the 
tipping damage is moderate. 4) The threat of possible tipping events would increase the 
size of the coalition if the signatories’ coalition is the first mover.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
studies in the literature. Section 3 presents the game and its equilibria in different cases. 
Section 4 summarizes the findings on the effect of the threat from climate tipping on the 
size of a stable IEA. Section 5 illustrates theoretical results with numerical simulations. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
International environmental agreements (IEAs) have been considered an 
important measure to improve cooperation on environmental protection and have been 
applied to various transboundary pollution issues, including ozone layer depletion, 
climate change, and so on (Finus 2002; Chander and Tulkens 1995). Barrett (1994) 
investigated the properties of self-enforcing IEAs and found that the number of 
signatories is small in coalitions that are both internally and externally stable. Barrett’s 
work has been used and extended by many others with various perspectives and different 
focuses: 
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a) On the impacts of heterogeneous countries. For instance, Barrett (1995) divided 
countries into two groups and found that the conclusions derived from homogeneous 
countries can still hold. Fuentes and Rubio (2010) investigated the effect of payment 
transfers and heterogeneous abatement costs/benefits, showing that the assumption of 
heterogeneity had no significant impact on the size of the coalition, compared with 
the homogeneous case, if the only difference among countries was the abatement 
costs or if there were no transfers. With a large number of asymmetric nations and 
tradable pollution permits, McGinty (2006) found that the asymmetric case was 
similar to the symmetric case in the sense that the gains from cooperation decreased 
with the size of the coalition.  
b) On the dynamic aspect of IEAs. For instance, Germain et al. (2003) found that the 
stability of a coalition needs to be ensured by transfers when the stock of pollution 
changes with time. Rubio and Ulph (2007) studied how the membership of an IEA 
would change with time, and found that the size of the IEA falls toward its steady 
state, while the stock of pollution rises toward its steady state. Breton et al. (2010) 
investigated the dynamic path of reaching a stable IEA when the signatories could 
punish the non-signatories, and showed that the size of a stable coalition depends on 
the initial pollution stock and the initial size of the coalition. Ulph (2004) compared 
fixed and variable membership and found that there would be higher social welfare 
with variable membership.  
c) On the impact of uncertainties on IEAs. For instance, Iida (1993) studied the effect of 
modeling uncertainties on the characteristics of payoffs and found that uncertainties 
would undermine cooperation. Systematic uncertainties decrease the scope of 
participation in IEAs and, in the case of uncertainty regarding damage, the effect of 
learning depends on the parameters (Kolstad 2007). Kolstad and Ulph (2008) found 
that learning would generally reduce the global welfare from forming an IEA due to 
strategic interactions between decision-makers. 
d) On the robustness of IEA size with respect to the non-parametric/parametric 
approaches. For instance, Karp and Simon (2013) showed that the conventional 
conclusions on the stable size of IEAs are not robust but depend on the parametric 
forms of cost/benefit functions. In addition, they showed that reductions in marginal 
abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium 
membership. Lessmann et al. (2015) numerically identified robust results concerning 
the incentives of different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and 
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estimated the extent of greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable 
agreements. 
Notably, some scholars have paid attention to the decision order of signatories 
and non-signatories in modeling IEAs, which could have an influence on individual 
countries’ payoffs and could further affect the size of a stable coalition. While some 
studies assume that signatories and non-signatories make decisions simultaneously, i.e., 
they play a Nash game (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; De Cara and Rotillon 2003; Finus 
and Rundshagen 2001; Rubio and Casino 2001), other scholars believe that the 
signatories can make decisions prior to non-signatories, i.e., countries play a Stackelberg 
game (Barrett 1994; McGinty 2006; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis 2006; Rubio and Ulph 
2007; İriş and Tavoni 2016). In the real world, signatories would sign an agreement with 
a commitment of future emissions, and non-signatories would consequently take the 
signatories’ strategy into account when making decisions. The previous studies show that 
the size of a stable IEA may be different when they act in a Stackelberg fashion. Rubio 
and Ulph (2002) compared the results for a Nash game and those for a Stackelberg game, 
where they claimed that a stable IEA consists of three countries at most in a Nash game, 
while the size of a stable coalition in a Stackelberg game depends on the marginal 
damage.  
The possible damage due to emissions is one of the most important concerns in 
the negotiation of an environmental agreement or climate treaty. As mentioned above, the 
rise of global temperature can push the global environmental system toward a threshold 
where sudden, irreversible events would occur and lead to remarkable and persistent 
damage (so called ‘tipping events’). Lenton et al. (2008) considered a number of tipping 
elements in the climate system that could reach such thresholds in this century. Quite a 
few scientists have highlighted the catastrophic damage to economies and ecosystems 
that could be caused by abrupt climatic changes, and have suggested that decision-makers 
take into account such threats in policy design (Alley et al. 2003; Lenton 2011; Overpeck 
and Cole 2006).  
Climate tipping events have also drawn the attention of environmental economists 
in recent years, triggering a wave of studies on the impacts of possible tipping events on 
economies and societies. A number of studies investigate optimal climate policies, e.g., 
carbon taxes, under the threat of tipping events by incorporating climatic thresholds in 
integrated assessment models (IAM) (Brozovic and Schlenker 2011; de Zeeuw and 
Zemel 2012; Cai et al. 2013; Lemoine and Traeger 2014). The results are very different 
when tipping events are considered compared to when they are omitted. For instance, 
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Lemoine and Traeger (2014) used a recursive numerical climate-economy model to 
endogenize the probability of tipping and to learn about the location of the temperature 
threshold, and found that a greater possibility of climate tipping in the relatively near 
future would induce governments to increase carbon taxes. Mclnerney et al. (2012) 
incorporated the climatic threshold, parametric uncertainties, structural uncertainties and 
learning into the DICE-07 model, where they found that increasing the near-term 
investment in emission reduction would be a good way to improve the robustness of 
climatic strategies. De Zeeuw and Zemel (2012) analyzed how to manage risk with 
possible abrupt events under a dynamic framework, which could be applied to study 
pollution control under the threat of regime shifts. Barrett (2013) analyzed the countries’ 
abatement behavior when taking catastrophic climate change into consideration and 
obtained conditions which could sustain full participation in climate treaties with certain 
and uncertain catastrophe. Nkuiya (2015) examined the effect of potential shift in damage 
on countries’ behavior and their welfare in a transboundary pollution game when 
countries act non-cooperatively. Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2016) investigated how 
climate catastrophes affect carbon taxes and precautionary saving when the North and 
South cooperate and when they do not. When they cooperate, carbon taxes would 
converge for developing and developed regions; otherwise, carbon taxes would diverge 
and there would be a bit more precautionary saving. Bahel (2017) built a dynamic model 
to analyze the global pollution problem with a critical threshold among heterogeneous 
countries and found that emissions are proportional to the gap between threshold and 
current stock in both non-cooperation and cooperation cases. Zhang and Zhu (2017) used 
a dynamic game model to investigate the effect of climate tipping events on strategic 
interaction between carbon taxes and energy prices, and found that tipping events would 
increase the carbon tax, decrease the wellhead fuel price, and shift the consumer price 
upward. 
Recently, several studies have recognized the linkage between climate tipping and 
the participation of IEAs; those studies mainly focused on the effect of uncertainty in 
climate tipping (regime shift). Barrett (2013) and Barrett and Dannenberg (2014) 
designed various laboratory experiments to simulate countries’ emission decisions with 
the possibility of climate tipping, where they found different tendencies to cooperate 
under a certain versus uncertain threshold of tipping. Nkuiya et al. (2015) focused on the 
effect of endogenous uncertainty of a regime shift in environmental damage on the 
participation in an IEA in a two-period framework, where the probability of a regime 
shift increases in the first-period pollution stock. They found that endogenous uncertainty 
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appears to lower the pollution stock of both periods and increase the size of self-
enforcing coalitions in period 1, compared to the case where the probability of the 
damage shift is exogenous. Schmidt (2017) investigated how a climate tipping point with 
unknown threshold would affect cooperation among countries, and found that climate 
tipping could improve the prospects of cooperation and that cooperation would allow 
countries to allocate their abatement efforts efficiently over time, leading to additional 
welfare gains from cooperation. 
Focusing on the effect of climate tipping with a given threshold, in this paper we 
investigate the interactions between the climate tipping threat and international 
cooperation in various cases. We obtain analytic results regarding the stable sizes of 
coalitions and whether the climate system would cross the tipping point in equilibrium, 
with different locations of the tipping point and magnitudes of tipping damage. 
3. Model 
With  identical countries (indexed by ), every country will choose its 
emissions . Total emissions are . Here, the tipping point refers to a threshold 
measured by the concentration (total emissions) of CO2 in the atmosphere, such that an 
abrupt, irreversible change in the climatic system will occur once it has been passed 
(IPCC 2014; Alley et al. 2003; Overpeck and Cole 2006). Assume  represents the 
triggering level of the amount of total CO2 emissions in the atmosphere above which the 
tipping events would occur. The damage resulting from CO2 concentration is assumed to 
be  for each country if climate tipping does not happen (i.e., if ),1 where  is 
the marginal damage due to emissions. A jump in the damage will occur and each 
country will suffer from the tipping events if the climate system crosses the tipping point. 
The damage from the tipping events (so-called ‘tipping damage’) for one country is set as 
 and therefore the total damage in the case of total emissions passing the threshold (i.e., 
if )  is . 
Meanwhile, countries receive benefits from emissions, which are represented in a 
quadratic form, , as in Dockner and Long (1993), McGinty (2006), and 
Breton et al. (2010), where  is the marginal benefit of the first unit of emissions. 
                                                 
1 The assumption of linear damage would facilitate the closed form of solutions in the model, as highlighted 
by previous studies such as Breton et al. (2010). In fact, linear damage is not uncommon in the literature of 
IEAs; see, e.g., Barrett (1994), Kolstad (2007), Kolstad and Ulph (2008), and McGinty (2010). 
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1
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Therefore, the net benefit (payoff) of country  is  if the climate tipping 
does not occur and  if the climate tipping happens. The total net 
benefit of all countries is thus defined as  if  and  if . 
3.1. The Fully Cooperative Case 
In this case, all countries cooperate fully and decide their total emissions ( ) 
jointly. Therefore, the optimization problem for the coalition to maximize the total joint 
net benefits can be expressed as below, where the superscript ‘ ’ denotes full 
cooperation.  
  (1) 
where  
As can be seen in (1), the fully-cooperative case of the game is degraded to a 
simple optimization problem. The objective function is piecewise but continuous in  
for each of its intervals (total emissions passing the threshold or not). The optimal value 
of total benefits in each interval can be derived through the first-order conditions, and the 
optimal emission decision under the full cooperation case ( ) can therefore be obtained 
by comparing the maximized values in the two intervals (and choosing the larger one). 
The optimal solution would be the fully-cooperative equilibrium, and the results are 
summarized in Proposition 1. Note that each individual country’s emissions (denoted as 
) and net benefits (denoted as ) are the same due to the 
symmetric-players assumption.2 
                                                 
2 The subscripts are ignored due to the assumption of symmetric players. 
i 21
2i i i
aq q bQπ = − −
21
2
tp
i i iaq q bQ Lπ = − − −
1
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i
i
π
=
Π = ∑ Q Z≤
1
n
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i
i
π
=
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cQ
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Q
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2
2
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2
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Proposition 1.  
When all countries cooperate,  
1) If , the total emissions are ; each country’s emissions are 
; the corresponding net benefits of each country are ; and the 
climate system would not cross the tipping point in equilibrium.  
2) If  & , the total emissions are ; each country’s 
emissions are ; the corresponding net benefits of each country are 
; and the climate system would not cross the tipping point in 
equilibrium.  
3) If  & , the total emissions are ; each 
country’s emissions are ; the corresponding net benefits of each country are 
; and the climate system would cross the tipping point in equilibrium.  
Proof. See Appendix A1. 
Proposition 1 states that, if the threshold of total emissions that would trigger 
climate tipping (i.e., ) is high, the climate system would not cross the tipping point 
under full cooperation. Otherwise, whether the climate system would cross the tipping 
point depends on the magnitude of tipping damage, for the following reasons. If the 
tipping damage is high, it is optimal for countries to make an effort in emission control so 
as to prevent the occurrence of climate tipping; if the tipping damage is low, the 
individual countries do not pay enough attention to the tipping point. 
3.2. The Non-Cooperative Case 
In this case, each country makes its decision to maximize its own net benefits. 
That is, the representative country chooses its own emissions, taking the emissions of the 
other countries as given. Therefore, the optimization problem for the representative 
country in the game can be expressed as below, where the superscript ‘ ’ denotes non-
cooperation.  
( )Z n a nb≥ − * ( )cQ n a nb= −
*cq a nb= − * 2
1 ( )
2
c a nbπ = −
( )Z n a nb< − 2
1 ( )
2
ZL a nb
n
≥ − − *cQ Z=
*c Zq
n
=
* 21 ( ) ( )
2
c Z Za nb
n n
π = − + −
( )Z n a nb< − 2
1 ( )
2
ZL a nb
n
< − − * ( )cQ n a nb= −
*cq a nb= −
* 21 ( )
2
c a nb Lπ = − −
Z
oc
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  (2) 
where . 
Calculating the first-order conditions for optimization in each interval, the best 
response function of each country can be obtained. Solving them simultaneously, the 
equilibrium condition can be derived. The detailed calculation can be seen in Appendix 
A2. The results of non-cooperative equilibria are summarized in Proposition 2. Note that 
and  denote the equilibrium emissions and the corresponding payoffs for a 
country, respectively. 
Proposition 2.  
When there is no cooperation among countries,  
1) If , the optimal emissions of each country are ; the 
corresponding net benefits are ; and the climate system would 
not cross the tipping point in equilibrium. 
2) If  & , the optimal emissions of each country are ; 
the corresponding net benefits are ; and the climate system 
would not cross the tipping point in equilibrium; 
3) If & , the optimal emissions of each country are 
;the corresponding net benefits are ; and the 
climate system would cross the tipping point in equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix A2. 
It can be seen from the comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 that the emissions in 
the fully-cooperative equilibrium are generally smaller than those in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the fully-cooperative case and the 
non-cooperative case in terms of the emissions and net benefits of a representative 
country, where  is the difference in emissions and  is the 
difference in net benefits. 
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2
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Table 1. Differences between the Fully Cooperative Case (‘ ’)  
and the Non-Cooperative Case (‘oc’) 
 
It can be seen from Table 1 that, in general, the emissions are higher and the net 
benefits are lower in the non-cooperative case, compared with the cooperative case. Also, 
the climate system is more likely to cross the tipping point in the non-cooperative case, 
which implies that cooperation could reduce the possibility of climate tipping by making 
individual countries emit less when taking into account the externality of their emissions, 
since they would maximize the total joint benefits rather than individual benefits. The 
incremental benefits from cooperation ( ) would always be non-negative, regardless 
of the threshold for tipping or the magnitude of tipping damage. Moreover, the emissions 
reduction due to cooperation ( ) would increase with greater marginal damage3 but 
decrease with a greater marginal benefit of emissions in most cases. 
3.3. The Partially-Cooperative Case 
The fully-cooperative case and the non-cooperative case investigated above are 
two of the extremes. A more realistic case would be that some countries participate in 
cooperation while others do not, i.e., the cooperation is partial only. 
                                                 
3 This result is consistent with the conclusion in Barrett (1994). 
c
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Assume that there are  countries signing the IEA to form a coalition (‘ ’ is an 
integer that is not greater than ‘ ’), and that the remaining  countries do not 
cooperate (i.e., they act individually). The objective of the coalition is to maximize all 
signatories’ total net benefits, while for the non-signatory the objective is to maximize its 
own net benefits individually. Superscripts ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ are used to denote the variables 
for signatories and non-signatories respectively. The respective optimization problems of 
the signatories’ coalition and the non-signatories can therefore be expressed as (3) and 
(4). 
                                (3) 
where . 
  (4) 
where . 
Due to the symmetric-player assumption, the emissions and net benefits of a 
signatory country would be  and  respectively. The total 
emissions of all countries are therefore , where ‘ ’ represents ‘partial 
cooperation.’ 
3.3.1. Nash Equilibrium  
  By obtaining the reaction functions of signatories and non-signatories, the Nash 
equilibrium can be solved (see details in Appendix A3) and summarized in Proposition 3, 
where , ,  and  denote the Nash equilibrium emissions and 
the corresponding payoffs for a signatory country and a non-signatory country, 
respectively. 
Proposition 3.  
With  countries signing the IEA, 
1) If , the respective emissions for a signatory and a non-signatory 
in the Nash equilibrium are  and , and the corresponding 
m m
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net benefits are and 
 
respectively. The climate system would 
not cross the tipping point in the Nash equilibrium. 
2) If  & , the respective emissions for a 
signatory and a non-signatory in the Nash equilibrium are  and 
, and the corresponding net benefits are 
 and 
, respectively. The climate system would not 
cross the tipping point in the Nash equilibrium. 
3) If  & , the respective emissions for a 
signatory and a non-signatory in the Nash equilibrium are  and 
, and the corresponding net benefits are 
and
, respectively. The climate system 
would cross the tipping point in the Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix A3. 
  According to Proposition 3, the form of the results under partial cooperation are 
similar to those under full cooperation and non-cooperation. Because no country can be 
forced to sign an IEA and signatories to an IEA can always withdraw from the 
agreement, the IEAs must be self-enforcing. Therefore it is worth investigating the scale 
of participation in self-enforcing IEAs that are stable in equilibrium. Referring to Barrett 
(1994), this paper adopts the definition of stability in oligopoly models (d’Aspremont et 
al. 1983), including internal stability (i.e., no signatory would like to become a non-
signatory) and external stability (no non-signatory wants to become a signatory). We 
limit our analysis to the case of only one coalition formed by the signatories, and 
investigate the stability of this unique coalition, as in Barrett (1994), not taking into 
consideration the stability of the coalition’s structure where there exist several coalitions.   
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Given  countries signing the IEA, let  and  denote net benefits of a 
signatory and a non-signatory, respectively, Considering internal and external stability, a 
stable IEA needs to meet the following conditions: 
 
  (5) 
From (5), one can obtain the size of a stable coalition under various 
circumstances, as summarized in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4.  
The number of signatory countries, , which would support a stable coalition 
in the Nash equilibrium, is as follows: 
1) If ,  or ; 
2) If : 
a) If  , ; 
b) If  ,  or ; 
3) If : 
a) If , there is no stable coalition; 
b) If ,  
or  or  ; 
c) If ,  or ; 
where  ,   and  satisfies 
. 
Proof. See Appendix A4. 
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The results summarized in Proposition 4 have several implications: 
1) If the threshold of total emissions for tipping is sufficiently high, or the threshold is 
low but the tipping damage is also low, there would be no large-scale stable cooperation. 
Coalitions with only two or three countries would be stable, which is in accordance with 
previous research on the absence of tipping events (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Hoel 1992). 
 2) If the threshold for tipping is low but the tipping damage is high, there would be no 
stable coalition, and the climate system would not cross the tipping point in the Nash 
equilibrium. A signatory’s total net benefit on average is always smaller than that of a 
non-signatory (as can be seen in Proposition 3); this implies that the non-signatories 
could free-ride on the damage avoided by the signatories. The IEA is not stable because 
the signatories’ coalition possesses only external stability but not internal stability. 
Therefore, there would be no stable coalition under this circumstance. 
  3) If the threshold of total emissions is low and the tipping damage is moderate, the 
largest size of a stable coalition is less than  but increases as the threshold for tipping 
decreases, which implies that more countries would sign an IEA if the current 
concentration level is closer to the threshold. In addition, the size of a stable coalition 
would decrease with greater tipping damage. Furthermore, under this circumstance, no 
signatory would leave the coalition because it would gain less (i.e., if a signatory left, the 
climate system would cross the tipping point), which implies that the internal stability of 
a coalition would be satisfied. Thus, the threat of climate tipping enlarges the size of a 
stable coalition under this circumstance. 
3.3.2. Stackelberg Equilibrium  
In the Nash equilibrium presented above, the signatories and non-signatories 
make their decisions simultaneously. In reality, however, it is possible that the signatories 
could make decisions in advance (first mover), since the signatories need to make 
promises about their emissions when signing IEAs, as highlighted in the literature, e.g., 
Rubio and Ulph (2002) and İriş and Tavoni (2016). Therefore, in what follows, we also 
present the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the signatories’ coalition is treated as a leader 
that is the first mover (in choosing its emissions level), while the non-signatories are 
followers that decide their emissions levels based on the coalition’s strategy. The 
Stackelberg equilibrium is summarized in Proposition 5，and the detailed solution can be 
found in Appendix A5. Note that , , and  in Proposition 5 
2
3
n
* ( )sStackq m
* ( )fStackq m
* ( )sStack mπ
* ( )fStack mπ
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denote Stackelberg equilibrium emissions for a signatory and a non-signatory’s 
corresponding net benefits, respectively. Also, , .  
Proposition 5. 
With  countries signing an IEA, 
1) If , the respective emissions for signatories and non-signatories in 
the Stackelberg equilibrium are and , and the corresponding 
net benefits are and 
, respectively. The climate system would 
not cross the tipping point in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
2) If &  , the respective emissions for 
signatories and non-signatories in the Stackelberg equilibrium are and 
, and the corresponding net benefits are 
and , 
respectively. The climate system would not cross the tipping point in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium; 
3) If & , the respective 
emissions for signatories and non-signatories in the Stackelberg equilibrium are 
and , and the corresponding net 
benefits are and
, respectively. The climate system would not cross the 
tipping point in the Stackelberg equilibrium; 
4) If & , the respective emissions for signatories and 
non-signatories in the Stackelberg equilibrium are and , and the 
corresponding net benefits are and 
 
, respectively. The climate system 
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would cross the tipping point in the Stackelberg equilibrium, where 
if  , and 
 if 
. 
Proof. See Appendix A5. 
  
By comparing Propositions 3 and 5, the following observations can be obtained: 
1) if the threshold of total emissions is sufficiently high, or the threshold is low but the 
tipping damage is also low, the results of the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg 
equilibrium would be the same, because in this circumstance the reaction functions of 
countries are independent of others’ action. 2) If the threshold of total emissions is low 
but the tipping damage is high, the signatories’ benefits would increase while non-
signatories’ benefits would decrease in the Stackelberg equilibrium, compared with the 
case in the Nash equilibrium, which reflects the signatories’ first-mover advantage.  
  In the Stackelberg game, if the threshold is low and the tipping damage is high, 
because the signatories’ coalition tends to prevent the climate system from crossing the 
tipping point, its optimal strategy is to leave some emitting room ( ) for the non-
signatories to assure that their gains are no less than those in the case of emitting more 
and triggering the tipping. Such emitting room is smaller than that in the Nash game case, 
which implies that the signatories may emit more and therefore non-signatories may emit 
less.  
  Proposition 6 summarizes how the stable size of the signatories’ coalition would 
change with respect to the threshold of total emissions and tipping damage. 
Proposition 6 
The number of signatory countries  that would support a stable coalition in 
the Stackelberg game follows: 
1) If ,  or ; 
2) If , 
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a) If , ; 
b) If , ; 
c) If , or ; 
3) If  
a) If , ; 
b) If , 
; 
c) If , ; 
d) If ,  or ; 
4) If  
a) If , ; 
b) If , ; 
c) If , or  or  ; 
d) If ,  or ; 
5) If  
a) If , ; 
b) If , ; 
c) If , or  or ; 
21 ( )
2
ZL a b
n
> − − *
1 1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
21= ( )
2
ZL a b
n
− − *
1 12,3
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
，，
21 ( )
2
ZL a b
n
< − − * 2Stackm = 3
2 21 1 +
2 2 2 2
n n n nna nb b b Z na nb b b− −       − − − ≤ < − −              
2min(( 1) , )1 ( )
2 ( 1)
S
S
Z k a ZL a b
n k
− −
≥ − −
− −
* 1 1 +1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
2 2min(( 1) , )1 1( ) ( )
2 2 ( 1)
S
S
Z k a ZZa b L a b
n n k
− −
− − < < − −
− −
* 1 1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
21= ( )
2
ZL a b
n
− − *
1 12,3
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
，，
21 ( )
2
ZL a b
n
< − − * 2Stackm = 3
2
2 1 1
2 2
n nna nb Ub U b Z na nb b b− −   − − − ≤ < − − −      
21 ( )
2
ZL a b
n
> − − *
1 1 +1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
21= ( )
2
ZL a b
n
− − *
1 12,3 +1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
，，
2 21 1( 1) ( )
2 2S
ZA k L a b
n
− ≤ < − − * 2Stackm = 3
1 1 +1
2 4
na nb Z
b
 − −
+ + 
  
21 ( 1)
2 S
L A k< − * 2Stackm = 3
2 2na n b Z na nb Ub U b− ≤ < − − −
21 ( )
2
ZL a b
n
> − − *
1 1 +1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
21= ( )
2
ZL a b
n
− − *
1 12,3 +1
2 4Stack
na nb Zm
b
 − −
= + + 
  
，，
2 21 1( ) ( )
2 2S
ZA k L a b
n
≤ < − − * 2Stackm = 3
1 1 +1
2 4
na nb Z
b
 − −
+ + 
  
Environment for Development Liu et al. 
18 
d) If ,  or ; 
6) If  
a) If , ; 
b) If , ; 
c) If ,  or . 
where , and  satisfies 
 and .  
Here,  is the same function as that in Proposition 5. 
Proof. See Appendix A6.  
  From Proposition 6, it can be seen that, if the threshold of total emissions is low 
but the tipping damage is also low, a stable coalition would have only two or three 
countries, i.e., there is no large-scale stable cooperation. If the tipping damage is 
moderate, more countries tend to participate in the IEA as the threshold of total emissions 
decreases, which leads to a larger scale of cooperation. If the tipping damage is 
sufficiently high, all countries tend to be signatories. This is because the coalition’s first-
mover advantage would bring signatories more benefit than non-signatories, which 
implies that in this circumstance a coalition would have internal stability but not external 
stability, and thus only a grand coalition would be stable. This result is similar to Rubio 
and Ulph (2002)’s conclusion that a grand coalition is stable if marginal damage is 
sufficiently high. Compared with the result with no stable coalition in the Nash equilibrium, it 
can be seen that the first-mover advantage could induce more countries to join the coalition, 
which is consistent with the findings in Rubio and Ulph (2002) that the first-mover 
advantage could increase the size of a stable coalition and decrease free-riding behaviors.  
In addition, the critical value of the tipping damage (i.e.,  in Proposition 
6), which determines whether the size of a stable coalition is larger, increases as the 
threshold for tipping increases. This implies that, if the threshold for tipping is closer to 
the current concentration level, even low tipping damage could stimulate countries to 
cooperate. That is, when the situation of the climate system is threatening, countries 
would tend to cooperate to deal with it.  
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4. Discussion 
In Section 3, we saw that countries’ strategies and whether the climate system 
would cross the tipping point differ from one another in fully-cooperative, non-
cooperative and partially-cooperative cases, and that the size of a stable coalition would 
be different in the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. In this section, we 
will discuss the effect of different factors on the size of a stable coalition and whether the 
climate system would cross the tipping point. 
4.1. The Effect of the Climate Tipping Threat on the Size of a Stable 
Coalition 
As shown above, if there is no threat of tipping in the climate system, which 
would be equivalent to the case with a sufficiently high threshold for tipping, only the 
coalitions with two or three countries are stable. That is, only a small number of countries 
would sign the IEA voluntarily. 
If there exists the threat of climate tipping (i.e., the threshold for tipping is low), 
the size of a stable coalition would depend on the threshold for tipping, the magnitude of 
the tipping damage and whether the coalition is the first mover. Specifically, 1) if the 
tipping damage is also low, the size of a stable coalition is the same as that without the 
threat of climate tipping (i.e., only the coalitions with two or three countries are stable). 
2) If the tipping damage is moderate, the threat of tipping would stimulate more countries 
(but less than ) to cooperate, because a small coalition would not prevent the climate 
system from crossing the tipping point. 3) If the tipping damage is sufficiently high, there 
would be no stable coalition, i.e., the threat of climate tipping would decrease the size of 
a stable coalition. However, if the signatories’ coalition can move first, the grand 
coalition would be stable, i.e., the tipping threat promotes the signing of IEAs under this 
circumstance. 
4.2. The Factors Influencing Whether the Climate Tips 
  Figure 1 shows the boundaries of whether the climate system crosses tipping 
point with different thresholds and tipping damage in different cooperative cases. The 
climate system would cross the tipping point when the point is located in the area below 
the boundary, that is, the threshold for tipping and the tipping damage are both lower than 
certain critical values, which depend on the size of the coalition and parameters in the 
benefit and damage functions. 
2
3
n
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Figure 1. Summary of Areas Where the Climate System  
Would Tip under Various Circumstances 
 
 
 
4.2.1. The Effect of the Coalition’s Size  
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that the critical values of the threshold and damage 
which determine whether the climate system would tip are functions of the size of the 
signatories’ coalition. Assuming that the size of the coalition (i.e., ) is given, we can 
investigate the effect of the coalition’s size on the outcome of the climate. 1) For the 
critical value of the threshold for tipping , the derivative with 
respect to the size of the coalition is . With , we have . 
2) For the critical value of the tipping damage  , the 
derivative with respect to the size of the coalition, , would be negative because 
. That is, the critical values of the tipping threshold and the tipping damage decrease 
with the size of the coalition. Consequently, we know that the climate system is less 
likely to cross the tipping point with a larger size of coalition, because a larger size of 
coalition leads to less free-riding and less total emissions.  
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4.2.2. The Effect of Benefit and Damage Parameters  
In what follows, we investigate the effect of parameter ‘ ’ in the benefit function 
on whether the climate system would cross the tipping point, still assuming a given size 
of the coalition, . The partial derivatives of the critical values of the tipping threshold 
and tipping damage with respect to ‘ ’ are  and , respectively, 
implying that both critical values increase with ‘ ’. This indicates that the climate system 
is more likely to cross the tipping point with a larger ‘ ’, i.e., with larger benefit from 
emissions. 
Analogously, one can investigate the effect of the damage parameter ‘ ’. The 
partial derivatives of the critical values with respect to ‘ ’ are  and , 
respectively. This implies that the climate system is less likely to cross the tipping point 
with an increase of ‘ ’, due to the more aggressive emission reduction when the marginal 
damage is large. 
5. Numerical Illustrations 
To complement the theoretical analysis above, in this section we conducted 
various numerical simulations to test the predictions of the game model. Referring to 
Barrett (1994), the parameters are , , . We let the threshold of total 
emissions vary from 85000 to 105000 and tipping damage vary from 0 to 16000, in order 
to examine how the results would change with the parameters4. Based on the propositions 
in Section 3, we can obtain the equilibrium strategy under different cases, and then 
determine whether a coalition with a certain size is stable based on the stability 
conditions mentioned above (see the inequalities in (5)). 
5.1. Benefit from Full Cooperation 
The numerical results in the fully-cooperative and non-cooperative cases are 
illustrated in Fig. 2, from which it can be seen that full cooperation leads to a decrease of 
total emissions and increase of each country’s net benefits. 
                                                 
4 We take a value of the threshold every 500; then, there are 41 values. Taking a value of tipping damage 
every 400, there are also 41 values. Thus, there are a total of 1681 parameter combinations of the threshold 
and tipping damage, i.e., . 
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Figure 2. Effects of Cooperation on Emissions and Benefits 
 
 
 
                                       (a)                                                                                (b)  
When ,  – i.e., when the threshold for tipping is lowest 
and the tipping damage is moderate – full cooperation leads to the most dramatic 
emission reduction (14900). The largest incremental benefits from full cooperation 
(14451) occur when , . Due to the lower critical value of tipping 
damage in the fully cooperative case, when the tipping damage is moderate, in the fully 
cooperative case the optimal decision of countries is to make their total emissions just 
equal to the threshold to avoid the tipping damage. In the non-cooperative case, countries 
would emit more to maximize their own benefits, where the total emissions in 
equilibrium (which is a constant) are higher than the threshold. Under this circumstance, 
countries in the non-cooperative case would suffer tipping damage while countries in the 
fully cooperative case would not. Thus, the largest incremental benefits occur with the 
greatest tipping damage within this interval. 
We can also see that, if the threshold for tipping is low but the tipping damage is 
high, there is no difference in emissions and benefit between these two cases. For 
instance, when , , the emission reduction and incremental benefits are 
both zero. This is because countries would emit less to avoid the great tipping damage in 
this situation, whether or not they are in cooperation. 
5.2. The Size of a Stable IEA 
Table 2 summarizes the size of a stable signatories’ coalition under different 
parameter combinations. For instance, in both the Nash and the Stackelberg equilibrium, 
when , , and , , we have 
 
and
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, which means that the coalitions consisting of two or three countries are 
stable. When , in the Nash equilibrium we have  
for all , i.e., a signatory’s net benefit is always less than that of a non-signatory, 
implying that there is no stable coalition; while in the Stackelberg equilibrium, 
 for  would hold, i.e., a signatory’s net benefit is always 
larger than that of a non-signatory, implying that the coalition would be stable only when 
all countries sign the IEA. When , , in the Nash equilibrium we have 
 
,  and , which implies that the coalitions 
consisting of 2 or 3 or 39 countries are stable; while in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we 
have 
 
and , which implies that the coalitions consisting of 
two or three countries are stable. This is consistent with the prediction of Propositions 4 
and 6. 
Table 2. The Stable Number of Participants in IEA under  
Different Parameter Combinations 
 
Note: ‘X|Y’ in the table means the stable number in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium are ‘X’ and ‘Y’, 
respectively. Otherwise, the case without ‘|’ means the stable number in the two types of equilibrium is the 
same. ‘None’ means that there is no stable coalition.
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5.3. The Effect of Being the First Mover  
Figure 3 shows net benefits of a signatory and a non-signatory in the two types of 
equilibrium. It can be seen from Figures 3(a) and (b) that, if the threshold for tipping is 
low but the tipping damage is not sufficient low (i.e., , ), the difference 
of net benefits between a signatory and a non-signatory in the Stackelberg equilibrium is 
638, which is much greater than that in the Nash equilibrium (where there is no 
difference because there is no stable coalition, i.e., all countries are non-signatories). 
Besides, the net benefits of a signatory in the Stackelberg equilibrium are larger than 
those in the Nash equilibrium, which reflects the first-mover advantage of the signatories’ 
coalition under this circumstance.  
Figure 3. Each Country’s Net Benefits in the Nash and Stackelberg Equilibrium 
 
(a) The Nash equilibrium ( )      (b) The Stackelberg equilibrium ( ) 
 
5.4. Whether or Not the Climate Tips  
Fig. 4 shows whether the climate system crosses the tipping point under different 
circumstances. It can be seen that when, for instance, , , the climate 
system would cross the tipping point in the non-cooperative case, while not in the fully-
cooperative or partially-cooperative cases. When , , the climate system 
would cross the tipping point in the partially-cooperative and non-cooperative cases, 
while not in the fully cooperative case. Thus, a larger scale of cooperation makes climate 
tipping less likely to occur, which is consistent with our prediction in the analytic results 
above. 
Furthermore, the climate system is less likely to cross the tipping point if 
signatories and non-signatories make decisions simultaneously. For instance, when 
, , the climate system would cross the tipping point if signatories make 
98000Z = 400L ≥
98000Z = 98000Z =
=87500Z =6000L
=90000Z =1000L
=90000Z =4000L
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decisions in advance, while not if they make decisions simultaneously. Thus, the 
signatories’ coalition being the first mover may make the climate system more likely to 
cross the tipping point, due to the increased emissions of signatory countries compared to 
the Nash equilibrium. 
 Figure 4. Whether the Climate System Cross the Tipping Point in Various 
Cooperative Cases 
 
(a) The fully cooperative case               (b) The non-cooperative case 
 
(c) The partially cooperative case           (d) The partially cooperative case 
(the Nash equilibrium)                   (the Stackelberg equilibrium) 
 
5.5. The Effect of Benefit and Damage Parameters 
  Figure 5 presents the proportion of parameter combinations under which 
the climate system would cross the tipping point, with different values of ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ in 
the fully-cooperative and non-cooperative cases. It can be seen that the proportion in the 
( , )Z L
a b
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non-cooperative case is always larger than that in the fully-cooperative case, no matter 
how ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ change. Thus, the values of parameters would not change the conclusion 
that cooperation would make climate tipping less likely to occur, which also confirms our 
theoretical prediction above. 
Figure 5. The Effect of ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ on Whether the Climate System Would Cross 
the Tipping Point 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper introduces the possibility of climate tipping into a standard model of 
IEAs to investigate its effect on GHG emissions and international cooperation. We build 
a game-theoretical model under various cases to analytically illustrate how the threat of 
climate tipping would affect individual countries’ optimal emissions, their decisions 
about signing IEAs, and whether the climate system would cross the tipping point in 
equilibrium. In addition, we investigate the effect of possible tipping events on the scale 
of participation in IEAs on climate change in a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the 
signatories’ coalition is the first mover.  
  From the theoretical model and numerical illustrations, we draw conclusions 
that: 1) if the threshold of total emissions for tipping is high, or the threshold is low but 
the tipping damage is also low, the possibility of climate tipping would have no effect on 
countries’ emission decisions or on the size of a stable coalition; 2) if the threshold is low 
but tipping damage is moderate, there would be larger scale cooperation, with these 
circumstances promoting cooperation among countries owing to the fact that a smaller 
scale of cooperation might cause the climate system to cross the tipping point; 3) if the 
a b
a b
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threshold is low but tipping damage is high, the threat of climate tipping may weaken 
cooperation among countries in the Nash equilibrium; however, the possibility of climate 
tipping may promote cooperation in the Stackelberg equilibrium.  
In addition, we find that there might be more countries participating in 
cooperation when the current atmospheric carbon concentration is closer to the threshold 
for tipping. We also find that cooperation could decrease the possibilities of climate 
tipping through reducing free-riding. From these findings, we infer that a growing belief 
that the climate system is close to the tipping point may be one of the reasons that more 
countries signed the Paris Agreement than the earlier Kyoto Protocol.  
However, this paper is not without limitations. For the sake of simplicity, this 
paper uses a static model where the countries are symmetric. In the real world, countries 
are different from each other. In addition, they may make decisions dynamically over 
time in response to the natural decay and accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. Therefore, it is worth investigating international environmental agreements 
under the threat of climate tipping in a dynamic framework. In addition, relaxing the 
assumption of symmetric countries, which would allow the investigation of transfers 
among countries, can also be a direction for further research.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A1 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Full Cooperation 
In this case, there is only one decision variable, so this is degraded to an 
optimization problem. 
Both of the first-order conditions in two intervals are , so the 
optimal decision is , but it needs to satisfy some conditions.  
In the interval of , if , the optimal decision is ; if 
, the optimal decision is . Its optimal value of net benefits is . 
In the interval of , if , the optimal decision is ; if 
, the optimal decision is . Its optimal value of net benefits is 
.              
Comparing  and , the optimal decision is the decision which corresponds to 
larger benefits. 
Appendix A2 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Non-Cooperation. 
In this case, each country needs to decide its own emissions while taking others’ 
action as given. It is a Nash game. The first order condition is . Using a 
similar approach as in Appendix A1, we can obtain the best response function of country 
: 
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where . 
Solving these  equations simultaneously, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium: 
 
Substituting the strategy into the net benefit function, we can obtain the 
corresponding net benefits. Now, we need to verify that this strategy is a Nash 
equilibrium. Assume country  changes its emissions from  to , resulting in its 
net benefit changing from  to . Comparing  and , we find  is always 
less than . That is, if one country changes its strategy while others remain unchanged, 
its net benefits would decrease. Thus, the strategy in Proposition 2 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Appendix A3 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Partial Cooperation (Nash Equilibrium) 
In this case, we assume that signatories and non-signatories take action 
simultaneously. The signatories’ coalition decide their members’ emissions while taking 
non-signatories’ actions as given, and each non-signatory makes decisions while taking 
the signatories’ coalition and other non-signatories’ actions as given. The first-order 
conditions of the coalition and a non- signatory are  and  
respectively. Using a similar approach as in Appendix A2, we can obtain the best 
response function of the signatories’ coalition and a non-signatory: 
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where  and . 
Solving these  equations simultaneously, we can obtain the Nash 
equilibria.  
If , there would be many equilibria. Here, we just 
analyze the equilibrium in which the marginal net benefits of the signatories’ coalition 
and a non-signatory are the same, that is, . For instance, if tipping 
damage is sufficiently high, the reaction function of signatories and non-signatories is 
 . Thus, ,  
 . Then, we can get the only Nash equilibrium with different  and 
. 
We can verify this strategy is a Nash equilibrium using same method as in 
Appendix A2. Thus, the strategy in Proposition 3 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Appendix A4 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Partial cooperation (Nash Equilibrium) 
With different  and  , the equilibrium emissions of signatories are different. 
So, we need to verify whether the stability conditions mentioned in Section 3.3.1 (see the 
inequalities in (5)) hold under different  and , one by one. From the results in 
Proposition 3, we can get the value of , which could make the stability conditions (i.e., 
the size of a stable coalition) hold.  
It is necessary to note that, if , the benefits of coalitions differ 
with a different number of countries, resulting in different conditions for stability. 
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Assume that ,  when . Thus, 
 is a monotonically decreasing function of  when , i.e.  if 
. Obviously,  is a continuous function, and we have  and 
 Thus,  , ( )  which makes 
, that is, . For , 
; while for , .  
If , similarly, we know that there is always a 
( )  which makes  satisfy
. 
Summing up the above results, we can obtain the number of signatory countries, 
, which would support a stable coalition under different  and   in the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Appendix A5 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
Partial Cooperation (Stackelberg Equilibrium) 
In Stackelberg game, signatories make decisions before non-signatories. It is a 
two-stage game, and we use a backward induction method to solve it. First, non-
signatories decide their emissions while they know the total emissions of signatories , 
and the  non-signatories play a Nash game. This is similar to non-cooperative 
scenarios with a threshold of total emissions of . Thus, the equilibrium of non-
signatories is 
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Then, substituting the reaction function of non-signatories into the net benefit 
function of the signatories’ coalition, and maximizing, we can obtain the optimal strategy 
of the signatories’ coalition: 
 
where
  
Substituting the emissions of signatories into the reaction function of non-signatories, we 
can obtain the equilibrium strategy of non-signatories. 
Appendix A6 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
Partial Cooperation (Stackelberg Equilibrium) 
We adopt the same method as in Appendix A4. 
Adopting the results in Proposition 5 and verifying whether the stability 
conditions (see the inequalities in (5)) hold under different  and , one by one, we can 
obtain the value of  that make the stability conditions hold under different  and , 
that is, the size of a stable coalition.  
Summing up the above results, we can obtain the number of signatory countries, 
, which would support a stable coalition in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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